08: Negotiation an der Universität Würzburg | Karteikarten & Zusammenfassungen

Lernmaterialien für 08: Negotiation an der Universität Würzburg

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the effect of first offers

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

First offer = have an anchoring effect in bargaining strategy
 Bargaining strategy follows principle of start high/low depending on role and concede only enough to avoid impasse

First offers (single or multiple issue negotiation) strongly influence the ultimate outcome, because the counterpart ‘‘anchors” on the opening offer
 anchoring effect: whenever people make a judgement on uncertainty, the first number is influences every number which comes up afterwards (e.g.: guess how many African nations are part of the UN) -> effects on the estimated number by people (even if the given number is completely random)  as maybe explanation for the first-offer effect
  reasons for it: confirmation bias – people search for positive arguments; even researchers are searching for positive evidence for hypothesis

underlying psychological reason for the first offer advantage is that counterparts insufficiently adjust for the strategic, self-interested positioning of the first offer

eastern cultures: often less open for too aggressive behavior in negotiations

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

What are the negotiation-correlates of social motives?

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- three social motives: prosocial, proself individualistic and proself competitive

- social motives affect negotiators use of distributive and integrative strategy

- prosocials tend to use more integrative strategy to achieve higher joint gains

- prosocials are more sensitive to the context of other negotiators´ behavior than proself, so prosocials tend to adopt their strategy to the motivs of the other party whereas proselfs generally use the distributive strategies regardless of the motive of the counterpart


(Social motives = goals in social interaction)

Prosocial/ cooperatively motivated negotiators (trying to maximize outcomes for self & other)

 more concerned about other: might

Pro-self negotiators (individualistic motives, trying to maximize for self)

Pro-self negotiators with competitive motives (maximize the difference between self & other)

epistemic motivation as newer research motive need for structure on use of negotiation strategy and negotiation outcomes

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Define the terms distributive vs. integrative negotiation strategies

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Distributive:

- three different types: Take-it-or-leave-it, objective or fair standards and first offer and bargaining

- they have in common that negotiators tr to claim as much value as possible for themselves

Includes threats, emotional appeals and single issue offers in order to influence the counterpart to make concessions

Integrative:

- focused on creating value ad claiming value in order to achieve high joint values

- usually achieved by sharing information about interests and priorities that then helps to fashion tradeoffs 

- three types: explicit informational exchange, implicit informational exchange and heuristic trial and error

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe behaviors that go along with distributive vs. integrative negotiation strategies

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- using distributive strategy means to claim as much value as possible for oneself, concessions are wanted to be achieved by using threats, emotional appeals and single issue offers

a person attempts to influence the counterpart to make concessions by using threats and emotional appeals, and single issue offers
hide motives/the true interest (to be less vulnerable)
 objective standards as fixed “result” (not thinking about extending the pie): focuses on one dimension and do not extend

 

- using integrative strategy includes sharing information about interests and priorities that then helps to fashion tradeoffs (logrolling)

- negotiator shares info about interests, priorities, fashions tradeoffs (logrolling) to generate high joint gains

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

What is the role of objective standards in distributive negotiation? Give an example for an objective standard that people might use in a concrete negotiation.

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- objective standards refers to comparisons a negotiator might use to justify the fairness of his offer, aim is to influence the counterpart to make concessions

= distributive negotiation strategy, since intent is to influence counterpart to make concessions

- an example could be that people write down the (high) original price of an item that they want to sell on a second-hand platform to justify the price that they want to get for the item

- Example 2: an employer of a restaurant offers a potential employee a minimum wage salary, justifying it with the salary of the other employees

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the three integrative strategies of Pruitt (1981)

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Explicit informational exchange:

- exchange of questions and answers that generate insight about negotiators interests and priorities

- simplest route for joint gains

- was supported to work in several studies in all kinds of culture

Implicit informational exchange:

- could work as a substitute for explicit information exchange

- means that offers and influence attempts of negotiators reveal information about their underlying interests and priorities 

Heuristic trial and error:

- negotiators ask the counterpart to make extremely large concessions on issues that were particularly high priority to the negotiator

- reason for this is as well the aim to reveal information about interests and priorities

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the effects of mimicking the negotiation partner’s behavior

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- underlying effect is reciprocity which describes the kind responds to another´s social behavior

- in studies it was found that negotiators mimicking their counterpart gained more insight, generated mor trust and created and claimed more value (though not on the expense of their counterparts) than those who did not use mimicking

- based on the mechanism of reciprocity

- studies showed that mimicking in the first ten minutes seems to be most effective

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the fixed-pie bias and give an example.

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- means the faulty belief that the counterpart´s priorities are completely and directly opposed to one´s own, when in fact that is not necessarily true

- in an experiment negotiators were asked to complete the counterparts payoff schedule immediately following he negotiation → it was shown that most of the negotiators did hold the fixed pie perception

- an example would be that a city wants to reduce CO2 emissions and wants to achieve that by becoming a car-free city. The city did not involve the citizens in the decision-making process because they think that the citizens are not interested in it and will dislike everything that restricts their freedom. The citizens really don´t like the idea of being car-free and protest against that because they think it is all about getting rid of the cars. If he both parties would talk to another, they would find out that they are both interested in reducing CO2 and that just the way to achieve this (becoming car-free) is not ok for the citizens. The city is also ok with taking other options proposed by the citizens as long as they help to reduce the CO2 so they could find a solution for that together

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the incompatibility bias. How frequent/intense is it according to Thompson & Hastie (1990)?

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- is a dramatic extension of the fixed-pie-bias

- tendency for negotiators to devalue/dislike proposals presented by counterparties when the same proposal presented by their own side or a neutral party would be deemed accept

- means the faulty belief that another person has opposing preferences to one´s own interests when in fact the other person is actually in complete agreement

- approximately 40% of negotiators fail to realize when interests are perfectly compatible with others

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe the effect of expressed anger on negotiations as well as three moderating variables.

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

When anger does not provide any further information:

- negotiators are less compassionate toward each other and generate fewer joint gains

- other findings: anger leads to more concessions but also to covert retaliation or that anger caused the counterpart to use more positional statements but also to exchange less information about priorities

- negotiators that use the display of anger systematically were less likely to reach agreement, extract concessions or incorporate a future business relationship into the agreement than were those who strategically displayed positive or neutral emotions

When anger provides further information:

- model EASI (Emotions as social information) proposes that anger provides further information about the negotiators´ own higher limits anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions, especially when anger is an expression of threat and/or a sign for dominance

- several moderators between the relationship between anger and its desired effect to motivate the counterpart to make concessions

- three of them: the counterpart’s power, the counterpart’s culture and whether the counterpart views the anger as authentic


- When anger provided no new information but only reinforced old grievances or past reputations, negotiators who were angry with each other were less compassionate toward each other and achieved lower joint gains than negotiators who were not angry.

- Communicating anger led to concessions, but also to covert retaliation.

- Anger caused the other side to use more positional statements, but also to share less information about priorities.

- if anger provides information about the negotiator's own higher limits, anger motivates the other party to make concessions.

- Moderators:

(1) the other party's expectation that low offers will be rejected; the other party has no way to deceive the negotiator;

(2) the negative consequences of the disgruntled negotiator's rejection are low (the counterparty has a good BATNA) 

(3) the power of the counterparty 

(4) the culture of the other party - East Asians generally do not make concessions to angry negotiators 

(5) the object of the negotiator's anger, whether the other party itself or the other party's behavior 

(6) whether the other party views the anger as authentic 

(7) whether the anger is expressed privately rather than publicly



Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

What does the term „outcome potential” stand for in negotiation research?

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- outcome potential is determined by negotiators´ priorities and interests and means the potential value of their joint gains, so the most positive solution of a negotiation that could be achieved

- this outcome can be captured or be left on the table, which one of these options is chosen depends on the negotiator strategies

Lösung ausblenden
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Describe gender differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes. Which situations accentuate these differences? Which reduce these differences?

Lösung anzeigen
TESTE DEIN WISSEN

- because of stereotype threat women make less aggressive offers are less likely to initiate negotiations and more likely to avoid negotiation when it comes to negotiating compensation

- gender differences are magnified in ambiguous situations e.g. when women have not enough information to have a good negotiation and when they are unaccountable

- so the said from the other said, the gender differences are reduced in unambiguous situations and when woman are accountable which means that women feel more comfortable in negotiating, make more assertive offers, are more likely to express their interests and are more resisting in working towards better terms

- also less differences when women are advocating for others than when advocating for themselves

- the reason why women are less assertive than men is because they are afraid of backlashes, which is a negative social reaction toward women who show counter-stereotypical behaviors


Negotiation result

Study negotiation for car: men were offered better (lower) prices than women for the same script they used

Study cab (Peru): although same scriptmen: higher initial prices, final prices and more refusal male drivers more willing to capitulate to demanding male customers

Negotiation behavior

Women make less aggressive offers

Women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations when it comes to negotiating compensation, 

Women are more likely to avoid negotiations than men


Conditions that reinforce gender differences

Structural ambiguity

- Women are more likely to be disadvantaged in weak situations with high ambiguity than in strong, unambiguous situations.

- Women in management jobs that lacked information about their colleagues' salaries earned dramatically lower starting salaries than their male counterparts; this difference disappeared in management jobs that had clear information about comparable salaries.

Responsibility

- When given a sense of responsibility, women feel more comfortable negotiating, are more likely to express their interests, make more confident offers, and negotiate better terms.

- In self-advocacy contexts, women fear that self-assertion leads to backlash, so they are less confident and achieve lower outcomes. However, when women advocate for others (third-party advocacy), they are more assertive and achieve better outcomes.

- Nonetheless, women are generally less assertive than men in negotiations, and a key factor is fear of backlash. Backlash refers to the negative social reaction toward women when they are seen as violating gender norms because they behave in counter-stereotypical ways.




Lösung ausblenden
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Q:

Describe the effect of first offers

A:

First offer = have an anchoring effect in bargaining strategy
 Bargaining strategy follows principle of start high/low depending on role and concede only enough to avoid impasse

First offers (single or multiple issue negotiation) strongly influence the ultimate outcome, because the counterpart ‘‘anchors” on the opening offer
 anchoring effect: whenever people make a judgement on uncertainty, the first number is influences every number which comes up afterwards (e.g.: guess how many African nations are part of the UN) -> effects on the estimated number by people (even if the given number is completely random)  as maybe explanation for the first-offer effect
  reasons for it: confirmation bias – people search for positive arguments; even researchers are searching for positive evidence for hypothesis

underlying psychological reason for the first offer advantage is that counterparts insufficiently adjust for the strategic, self-interested positioning of the first offer

eastern cultures: often less open for too aggressive behavior in negotiations

Q:

What are the negotiation-correlates of social motives?

A:

- three social motives: prosocial, proself individualistic and proself competitive

- social motives affect negotiators use of distributive and integrative strategy

- prosocials tend to use more integrative strategy to achieve higher joint gains

- prosocials are more sensitive to the context of other negotiators´ behavior than proself, so prosocials tend to adopt their strategy to the motivs of the other party whereas proselfs generally use the distributive strategies regardless of the motive of the counterpart


(Social motives = goals in social interaction)

Prosocial/ cooperatively motivated negotiators (trying to maximize outcomes for self & other)

 more concerned about other: might

Pro-self negotiators (individualistic motives, trying to maximize for self)

Pro-self negotiators with competitive motives (maximize the difference between self & other)

epistemic motivation as newer research motive need for structure on use of negotiation strategy and negotiation outcomes

Q:

Define the terms distributive vs. integrative negotiation strategies

A:

Distributive:

- three different types: Take-it-or-leave-it, objective or fair standards and first offer and bargaining

- they have in common that negotiators tr to claim as much value as possible for themselves

Includes threats, emotional appeals and single issue offers in order to influence the counterpart to make concessions

Integrative:

- focused on creating value ad claiming value in order to achieve high joint values

- usually achieved by sharing information about interests and priorities that then helps to fashion tradeoffs 

- three types: explicit informational exchange, implicit informational exchange and heuristic trial and error

Q:

Describe behaviors that go along with distributive vs. integrative negotiation strategies

A:

- using distributive strategy means to claim as much value as possible for oneself, concessions are wanted to be achieved by using threats, emotional appeals and single issue offers

a person attempts to influence the counterpart to make concessions by using threats and emotional appeals, and single issue offers
hide motives/the true interest (to be less vulnerable)
 objective standards as fixed “result” (not thinking about extending the pie): focuses on one dimension and do not extend

 

- using integrative strategy includes sharing information about interests and priorities that then helps to fashion tradeoffs (logrolling)

- negotiator shares info about interests, priorities, fashions tradeoffs (logrolling) to generate high joint gains

Q:

What is the role of objective standards in distributive negotiation? Give an example for an objective standard that people might use in a concrete negotiation.

A:

- objective standards refers to comparisons a negotiator might use to justify the fairness of his offer, aim is to influence the counterpart to make concessions

= distributive negotiation strategy, since intent is to influence counterpart to make concessions

- an example could be that people write down the (high) original price of an item that they want to sell on a second-hand platform to justify the price that they want to get for the item

- Example 2: an employer of a restaurant offers a potential employee a minimum wage salary, justifying it with the salary of the other employees

Mehr Karteikarten anzeigen
Q:

Describe the three integrative strategies of Pruitt (1981)

A:

Explicit informational exchange:

- exchange of questions and answers that generate insight about negotiators interests and priorities

- simplest route for joint gains

- was supported to work in several studies in all kinds of culture

Implicit informational exchange:

- could work as a substitute for explicit information exchange

- means that offers and influence attempts of negotiators reveal information about their underlying interests and priorities 

Heuristic trial and error:

- negotiators ask the counterpart to make extremely large concessions on issues that were particularly high priority to the negotiator

- reason for this is as well the aim to reveal information about interests and priorities

Q:

Describe the effects of mimicking the negotiation partner’s behavior

A:

- underlying effect is reciprocity which describes the kind responds to another´s social behavior

- in studies it was found that negotiators mimicking their counterpart gained more insight, generated mor trust and created and claimed more value (though not on the expense of their counterparts) than those who did not use mimicking

- based on the mechanism of reciprocity

- studies showed that mimicking in the first ten minutes seems to be most effective

Q:

Describe the fixed-pie bias and give an example.

A:

- means the faulty belief that the counterpart´s priorities are completely and directly opposed to one´s own, when in fact that is not necessarily true

- in an experiment negotiators were asked to complete the counterparts payoff schedule immediately following he negotiation → it was shown that most of the negotiators did hold the fixed pie perception

- an example would be that a city wants to reduce CO2 emissions and wants to achieve that by becoming a car-free city. The city did not involve the citizens in the decision-making process because they think that the citizens are not interested in it and will dislike everything that restricts their freedom. The citizens really don´t like the idea of being car-free and protest against that because they think it is all about getting rid of the cars. If he both parties would talk to another, they would find out that they are both interested in reducing CO2 and that just the way to achieve this (becoming car-free) is not ok for the citizens. The city is also ok with taking other options proposed by the citizens as long as they help to reduce the CO2 so they could find a solution for that together

Q:

Describe the incompatibility bias. How frequent/intense is it according to Thompson & Hastie (1990)?

A:

- is a dramatic extension of the fixed-pie-bias

- tendency for negotiators to devalue/dislike proposals presented by counterparties when the same proposal presented by their own side or a neutral party would be deemed accept

- means the faulty belief that another person has opposing preferences to one´s own interests when in fact the other person is actually in complete agreement

- approximately 40% of negotiators fail to realize when interests are perfectly compatible with others

Q:

Describe the effect of expressed anger on negotiations as well as three moderating variables.

A:

When anger does not provide any further information:

- negotiators are less compassionate toward each other and generate fewer joint gains

- other findings: anger leads to more concessions but also to covert retaliation or that anger caused the counterpart to use more positional statements but also to exchange less information about priorities

- negotiators that use the display of anger systematically were less likely to reach agreement, extract concessions or incorporate a future business relationship into the agreement than were those who strategically displayed positive or neutral emotions

When anger provides further information:

- model EASI (Emotions as social information) proposes that anger provides further information about the negotiators´ own higher limits anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions, especially when anger is an expression of threat and/or a sign for dominance

- several moderators between the relationship between anger and its desired effect to motivate the counterpart to make concessions

- three of them: the counterpart’s power, the counterpart’s culture and whether the counterpart views the anger as authentic


- When anger provided no new information but only reinforced old grievances or past reputations, negotiators who were angry with each other were less compassionate toward each other and achieved lower joint gains than negotiators who were not angry.

- Communicating anger led to concessions, but also to covert retaliation.

- Anger caused the other side to use more positional statements, but also to share less information about priorities.

- if anger provides information about the negotiator's own higher limits, anger motivates the other party to make concessions.

- Moderators:

(1) the other party's expectation that low offers will be rejected; the other party has no way to deceive the negotiator;

(2) the negative consequences of the disgruntled negotiator's rejection are low (the counterparty has a good BATNA) 

(3) the power of the counterparty 

(4) the culture of the other party - East Asians generally do not make concessions to angry negotiators 

(5) the object of the negotiator's anger, whether the other party itself or the other party's behavior 

(6) whether the other party views the anger as authentic 

(7) whether the anger is expressed privately rather than publicly



Q:

What does the term „outcome potential” stand for in negotiation research?

A:

- outcome potential is determined by negotiators´ priorities and interests and means the potential value of their joint gains, so the most positive solution of a negotiation that could be achieved

- this outcome can be captured or be left on the table, which one of these options is chosen depends on the negotiator strategies

Q:

Describe gender differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes. Which situations accentuate these differences? Which reduce these differences?

A:

- because of stereotype threat women make less aggressive offers are less likely to initiate negotiations and more likely to avoid negotiation when it comes to negotiating compensation

- gender differences are magnified in ambiguous situations e.g. when women have not enough information to have a good negotiation and when they are unaccountable

- so the said from the other said, the gender differences are reduced in unambiguous situations and when woman are accountable which means that women feel more comfortable in negotiating, make more assertive offers, are more likely to express their interests and are more resisting in working towards better terms

- also less differences when women are advocating for others than when advocating for themselves

- the reason why women are less assertive than men is because they are afraid of backlashes, which is a negative social reaction toward women who show counter-stereotypical behaviors


Negotiation result

Study negotiation for car: men were offered better (lower) prices than women for the same script they used

Study cab (Peru): although same scriptmen: higher initial prices, final prices and more refusal male drivers more willing to capitulate to demanding male customers

Negotiation behavior

Women make less aggressive offers

Women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations when it comes to negotiating compensation, 

Women are more likely to avoid negotiations than men


Conditions that reinforce gender differences

Structural ambiguity

- Women are more likely to be disadvantaged in weak situations with high ambiguity than in strong, unambiguous situations.

- Women in management jobs that lacked information about their colleagues' salaries earned dramatically lower starting salaries than their male counterparts; this difference disappeared in management jobs that had clear information about comparable salaries.

Responsibility

- When given a sense of responsibility, women feel more comfortable negotiating, are more likely to express their interests, make more confident offers, and negotiate better terms.

- In self-advocacy contexts, women fear that self-assertion leads to backlash, so they are less confident and achieve lower outcomes. However, when women advocate for others (third-party advocacy), they are more assertive and achieve better outcomes.

- Nonetheless, women are generally less assertive than men in negotiations, and a key factor is fear of backlash. Backlash refers to the negative social reaction toward women when they are seen as violating gender norms because they behave in counter-stereotypical ways.




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