Collective Decision Making at Universität Magdeburg | Flashcards & Summaries

Lernmaterialien für Collective Decision Making an der Universität Magdeburg

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How to check for a Condorcet Voting Paradox

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x∈O is a condorcet winner if, for any other element y∈
O, the number of members who strictly prefer x over y exceeds the number of members who strictly prefer y over x -> No other option defeats a condorcet winner in binary majority voting

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Positivistic/"naturalistic" fallacy

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Something is considered "good" only because it exists

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Transaction cost examples

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

Finding a partner for a market interaction

Specifying the contract terms

Enforcing them according to the contract

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

When can an individuals preferences be represented by a numerical index ("utility") 

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If the preference order is transitive, complete, reflexive, antisymmetric

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Transitivity

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Transitiv if: A wins against B, B wins against C --> A wins against C

Formula: P(a,b)=a and P(b,c)=b --> P(a,c)=a

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Weak Preference vs Strong preference

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Weak preference is transitiv, complete, asymmetric, reflexive -> allows for total order of X

Strong preference is transitiv, perhaps complete, but not asymmetric, reflexive -> no total order

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Normative fallacy

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TESTE DEIN WISSEN

something is predicted only because it is desirable

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Institution's means to overcome the problems with markets

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  • Transaction costs vanish if partners do not have to make/enforce contracts
  • Externalities are internalized if the parties merge
  • Specific investments are protected from hold-up
  • Vertical integration alleviates some problems of economies of scale (double-marginalization)
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Organizational cost

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  • specification of the organizational contract (constitution)
  • coordination / decision procedure
  • safeguards against cheating of members (monitoring, incentives)
  • an agreement regarding the distribution of returns, costs, profits
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Four dimensions of contractual relations

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  • Frequency: one-shot or repeated interaction
  • Opportunism: do people pursue their interest even with "cunning"
  • Specific investments: do the contributions of one party (or both) have a lower value elsewhere?
  • Rationality (usually): maximize their utility, or do they only intend to do so (but are "bounded")

--> spot-markets, long-term contracts, or organization?

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Normative analsis

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Evaluate institutional arrangements and derive recommendations -> welfare, distribution, profit, consumer benefit

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Positive analysis

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Derivation/Prediction of outcomes, explanation of behavior --> equilibrium

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  • 39718 Karteikarten
  • 896 Studierende
  • 46 Lernmaterialien

Beispielhafte Karteikarten für deinen Collective Decision Making Kurs an der Universität Magdeburg - von Kommilitonen auf StudySmarter erstellt!

Q:

How to check for a Condorcet Voting Paradox

A:

x∈O is a condorcet winner if, for any other element y∈
O, the number of members who strictly prefer x over y exceeds the number of members who strictly prefer y over x -> No other option defeats a condorcet winner in binary majority voting

Q:

Positivistic/"naturalistic" fallacy

A:

Something is considered "good" only because it exists

Q:

Transaction cost examples

A:

Finding a partner for a market interaction

Specifying the contract terms

Enforcing them according to the contract

Q:

When can an individuals preferences be represented by a numerical index ("utility") 

A:

If the preference order is transitive, complete, reflexive, antisymmetric

Q:

Transitivity

A:

Transitiv if: A wins against B, B wins against C --> A wins against C

Formula: P(a,b)=a and P(b,c)=b --> P(a,c)=a

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Q:

Weak Preference vs Strong preference

A:

Weak preference is transitiv, complete, asymmetric, reflexive -> allows for total order of X

Strong preference is transitiv, perhaps complete, but not asymmetric, reflexive -> no total order

Q:

Normative fallacy

A:

something is predicted only because it is desirable

Q:

Institution's means to overcome the problems with markets

A:
  • Transaction costs vanish if partners do not have to make/enforce contracts
  • Externalities are internalized if the parties merge
  • Specific investments are protected from hold-up
  • Vertical integration alleviates some problems of economies of scale (double-marginalization)
Q:

Organizational cost

A:
  • specification of the organizational contract (constitution)
  • coordination / decision procedure
  • safeguards against cheating of members (monitoring, incentives)
  • an agreement regarding the distribution of returns, costs, profits
Q:

Four dimensions of contractual relations

A:
  • Frequency: one-shot or repeated interaction
  • Opportunism: do people pursue their interest even with "cunning"
  • Specific investments: do the contributions of one party (or both) have a lower value elsewhere?
  • Rationality (usually): maximize their utility, or do they only intend to do so (but are "bounded")

--> spot-markets, long-term contracts, or organization?

Q:

Normative analsis

A:

Evaluate institutional arrangements and derive recommendations -> welfare, distribution, profit, consumer benefit

Q:

Positive analysis

A:

Derivation/Prediction of outcomes, explanation of behavior --> equilibrium

Collective Decision Making

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